The rational solution of the Monty Hall problem unsettles many people. Most people, including the authors, think it feels wrong to switch the initial choice of one of the three doors, despite having fully accepted the mathematical proof for its superiority. Many people, if given the choice to switch, think the chances are fifty-fifty between their options, but still strongly prefer to stay with their initial choice. Is there some sense behind these irrational feelings?
The Monty Hall problem
The textbook Monty Hall [1, 2] problem goes as follows. A showmaster presents you three doors to choose from. Behind one is a sports car you win if you decide to open this door. Behind the others are goats that have no value to you. You indicate a choice, but before you open the chosen door, the showmaster opens another one, revealing a goat, and gives you the opportunity to revise your choice. Should you stay with your choice or should you switch to the other door?
The implicit assumption is that the showmaster always behaves in this way. In this case the optimal strategy can be found by various lines of arguments. Your initial probability of picking the right door is 1 /3. If your strategy is to always stay with your choice, this is your probability of winning the car, irrespective of whether the showmaster opens zero, one, or both other doors. In 2 /3 of the cases the car is behind one of the other doors. The showmaster is so friendly to indicate which of those is certainly wrong. So if you switch, and the car is behind one of the other doors, he guides you to the good one. This will work in 2 /3 of the cases, which is then the chance of winning if you switch..
So far so good. Logic has shown us what to do best. But -it just feels wrong. It feels so wrong that approximately 10, 000 readers of Marilyn vos Savant's column "Ask Marilyn" wrote to her that she must be erring after she had explained the correct solution to the Monty Hall problem.
Among them, nearly 1, 000 holders of PhDs [3] . Why don't they (and we) trust Marilyn? Well, probably, because for this we also have to trust the showmaster!
The evil showmaster
Imagine the textbook assumption is wrong that the showmaster always behaves in the described way. Real showmasters can and occasionally do behave differently. Imagine the worst case: the showmaster is evil [4] . If you pick a door with a goat, he will immediately open it and you lose. This happens in 2 /3 of the cases. In 1 /3 of the cases you pick the door with the car. Then, the evil showmaster opens another one in the hope that you play switch as you have learned this to be superior. In that case you lose as well. So if you always play switch and the showmaster plays evil, you always lose. However, if you play stay, you win in 1 /3 of the cases, namely, whenever you initially picked the door with the car. The showmaster cannot change this. Just be stubborn and ignore the seduction of a virtual additional chance of 1 /3 by switching and you defend the guaranteed 1 /3 winning chance of your initial choice.
A showmaster always playing evil would save the broadcasting company real money. Only 1 /3 of the stay-people get cars, and all the switch-people get only goats. However, he might ruin the show. It would become boring and people would stop watching it. Therefore, he should behave in an evil way only with some frequency p. And he should tai-lor this frequency to create maximal suspense while cutting financial losses.
Optimal moodiness
In order to optimally choose his frequency p of playing evil the showmaster has to consider the situation of his guests. For this, he better assumes that whatever frequency p he chooses, this will also be known to his guests. They might obtain this number by studying broadcasts of the show or by performing the same calculation as he does to determine his optimal moodiness, as we will do in the following.
Imagine that you have made your initial choice, and he has opened another door, revealing a goat. Should you now stay or switch? In the fraction p of the cases when his mood is evil you better stay, ensuring your winning probability of 1 /3. If you switch in this case, you surely lose. In the fraction 1 − p of the cases, when he plays the fair Monty Hall textbook showmaster, you win in 1 /3 of the cases if you stay and in 2 /3 if you switch. Multiplying and adding these cases together yields that you win with playing staying in
Which strategy is better depends on p. If p < 1 /2, switching is better, if p > 1 /2, staying is better, and for p = 1 /2 the strategy does not matter, you win in 1 /3 of all cases.
The showmaster should make you face a fifty-fifty chance of him being evil, as this will put you under maximal stress. This is what the audience wants to see and therefore this is what the showmaster will probably aim for. He might add or subtract a small margin, in order to save a bit money or to make the show more attractive, respectively, but this is hard for you to judge. He will make sure that you are nearly clueless about his mood by choosing p ≈ 1 /2. This optimal amount of evilness is therefore what you better assume. He will be moody just to the level to erase any information advantage you could have gotten from having observed his action.
The information game
The probability p = P (evil) describes your belief before the game that the showmaster has evil intentions. During the game the probability you assign to him being evil will change.
In case he opens the door you initially picked and reveals a goat there ("my" for "he opens my door"), you can be sure that he is evil, P (evil | my) = 1, as the "fair" showmaster never does this, but always opens an "other" door, P (my | fair) = 1 − P (other | fair) = 0. We assume here that no showmaster ever reveals the sports car without you insisting on choosing its door, P (other | car) = 1, where with "car" and "goat" we label what is behind your initially chosen door.
In the other case, where he opens another door, the situation is less clear. However, since some of the evil possibilities are ruled out, your confidence in him being in a fair mood has increased. How much can be worked out using Bayes' theorem as we have our prior beliefs P (evil) = p and P (fair) = 1 − p and can specify the likelihoods of the different events:
Going through the maths of Bayes' theorem we find
We have P (evil | other) = 1 /4 for p = 1 /2. Thus, having seen the showmaster opening another door, makes you more confident in him being fair. Should you therefore trust him and open the remaining door as now your probability of him being evil is well below 1 /2? Not at all! You better still play carefully, as the threshold of p = 1 /2 was derived for the prior probability P (evil) and not for the posterior probability P (evil | other). In fact all that matters to you is P (car | other), the probability that the car is behind your initially picked door, irrespective of whether the showmaster is evil or not. This requires you to marginalize out the momentary mood of the showmaster, but not his action, as the latter is important information. For calculating this chance, we recall that P (other | car) = 1 as any showmaster, regardless of fair or evil, will open another door if you picked the car. If you picked a goat, only the fair one will open another door. This will therefore happen with probability P (other | goat) = 1−p. The probabilities of seeing another door opened given what is behind your door now permit us to work out
Thus, a showmaster with evil intentions half of the time leaves us clueless behind which of the remaining doors the car is to be expected, P (car | other) = 1 /2 for p = 1 /2. This value is the intuitive feeling of many people about their chance, indicating that they also anticipate a fifty-fifty percent chance of the showmaster playing evil, an option a billion years of evolution have taught us never to forget. Or at least, our feeling tells us that the showmaster probably has erased any information we could have obtained on the correct door.
In contrast to this, a showmaster always exhibiting the same mood would provide you with information on the door with the car. His message, however, would depend on his mood. A showmaster always playing fairly (p = 0) would leave only a winning chance of P (car | other) = 1 /3 for your door, but 2 /3 for the remaining door. The always evil showmaster (p = 1) would inform us by opening another door that we picked the right one, as P (car | other) = 1 then. To benefit from this message, you would need to have identified his mood. But beware, he might have read your mind as well.
The mind-reading showmaster
If a fraction q = P (stay) of the guests of the show stay with their doors and 1 − q = P (switch) of the guests switch to the other door, the fraction of guests winning the car is P (win) = P (stay) P (car) + P (switch) P (fair) P (goat)
as "stay" wins irrespective of the showmaster's strategy if the car is behind the initial door, and "switch" wins if there was a goat and the showmaster plays fair. For the optimally moody showmaster with p = 1 /2 this means P (win) = 1 /3 as the guest strategy then does not matter. The always fair showmaster is significantly more expensive for the broadcasting company, as for p = 0 we have P (win) = (2−q) /3 ≥ 1 /3 and thus the switching guests double their chance. The always evil showmaster (p = 1) saves real money with P (win) = q /3 ≤ 1 /3 as all switching guests lose surely. However, he can follow this strategy only until the reputation of the show is ruined.
Anyhow, such an economic winning rate could also be achieved by a mind-reading showmaster, who adapts his strategy to the situation. He could play fair whenever there is a guest expected to play stay or one who will switch to a goat. Otherwise he plays evil. Then the number of winning guests would be that of the always evil master. But the showmaster would look much more generous than the evil one, as he opens other doors more frequently.
If the showmaster can read his guest's mind perfectly, the winning rate is P (win) = q /3 ≤ 1 /3, but he opens other doors in P (other | mind reader) = P (stay) + P (switch) P (car)
of the games, more often than the 1 /3 if always playing evil. This will look generous, given that most people prefer to stay in fear of an evil showmaster, meaning q > 1 /2, which implies P (other | mind reader) > 2 /3. With a bit of mindreading, the showmaster can keep a reputation of being very fair, while in fact saving real money for his company. And in 2 /3 of the games with guests that play stay, it will appear in the end that switching would have been the better choice. This should motivate enough of the people studying the show to use the switching strategy when they happen to play. As those switchers will never win, they contribute to the benefit of the company. Is this possibility realistic? Well, a good showmaster worth his money should be able to read his guest's mind. Before the game starts he interacted enough to get a good guess on the preferred strategy of the guest. The showmaster might even manage to manipulate the guest into adopting a certain strategy. Using this against his guest can make him look more fair than he is in reality. And if the showmaster is unsure, he just plays evil, to be on the safe side.
The acting guest
There is also a counter strategy available to the guest against the mind-reading showmaster. If the guest manages to act in a way that the showmaster believes the guest is playing stay, whereas the guest actually will play switch, the winning chance of the guest becomes 2 /3. This, however, won't work too often, as the showmaster will certainly recognize whenever being fooled. If this happens too often, he might get back to the randomized strategy. Or, in case he learns to identify the acting guests, he just plays evil on them and they go home with only a goat. Thus the acting guest takes a real risk. If caught, he loses for sure.
The real show
Most people will not perform the above mathematical consideration explicitly when faced with the situation of a real game show. Their intuition, however, will take many factors into account that the classical textbook version of the Monty Hall problem ignores. Intuition knows that the showmaster could have acted differently, might be evil, that he wants to create a situation of emotional tension, and probably wants to avoid giving away too many expensive cars. The showmaster will likely be perceived as an experienced veteran of many such shows, being well capable of guessing or manipulating the strategy of individual guests. Even if told that the showmaster will always open another door, intuition won't put too much belief in this claim. There is just too much circumstantial evidence coded into our intuition of real showmasters, and other predators, to behave differently, usually.
Therefore, people strongly feel that the chance of the car being behind their door is 1 /2, thereby implicitly assuming the showmaster to be in an evil mood in about 1 /2 of the cases. As the Monty Hall show is an information game, it would be very natural for the showmaster to try to erase any information his guest has on the proper door. The existence of such an information-erasing strategy for the showmaster largely determines the guest's intuition. He intuitively decides that his chance is at best 1 /3, irrespective of what he does, but potentially zero if he decides to switch and the showmaster uses mind-reading against his guests. The only safe strategy against this is to stay with the initial choice, thereby making any maneuver of the showmaster pointless, and ensuring bringing home a car in 1 /3 of the cases.
Thus, the apparent irrational strategy of staying is in fact very rational, as it is immune against all the mean tricks the showmaster might use. And the apparent contradiction between people assigning a 1 /2 chance to the car being behind the other door, but strongly insisting on staying to their door is also lifted. The former is an estimate, with some uncertainty attached to it. The latter is a decision, taking potential losses into account, which tells us that we could be a sure loser if the showmaster is mentally above us. Thus, our intuition turns out to be very rational, smart, and efficient, by coming to this solution in an instant, whereas going through the full maths takes longer than the game lasts.
Did the real Monty Hall knew about all this? We can let him answer this by himself [5] : "But if he has the choice whether to allow a switch or not, beware. Caveat emptor. It all depends on his mood.
